Zebra 6.1.0: New getstandardfee RPC and 4 Safety Fixes
We’re releasing Zebra 6.1.0 in the present day. This launch provides a brand new getstandardfee RPC and fixes 4 safety points affecting block verification, node liveness, and mining. There are not any consensus modifications. All node operators are inspired to improve.
New Options
getstandardfee RPC
A brand new getstandardfee RPC returns the ZIP-317 marginal price, giving wallets and different purchasers a direct option to question the present customary price. The worth can also be uncovered to Rust customers as transaction::zip317::MARGINAL_FEE. (#10717)
Safety Advisories
GHSA-95m2-vx53-v2jw: getblocktemplate Can Produce Outsized, Invalid Blocks (Low)
When Zebra constructed a block template, its ZIP-317 transaction selector budgeted mempool transactions towards the complete most block measurement whereas reserving house just for the coinbase transaction, not for the serialized block header or the transaction-count area, each of which depend towards the restrict (roughly 1,490 bytes on Mainnet and Testnet). If the chosen transactions crammed that margin, the assembled block exceeded the consensus measurement restrict, so a miner would carry out proof-of-work on a block that each node rejects, losing the work; an attacker in a position to place legitimate, selectable transactions in a sufferer miner’s mempool may intentionally form templates into the affected vary. Non-mining nodes have been unaffected, and since outsized blocks are accurately rejected there was no consensus divergence. Zebra now reserves the network-specific header measurement and the utmost transaction-count width earlier than deciding on transactions, so templates keep inside the restrict. Due to @ebfull of Challenge Tachyon for reporting this problem by way of coordinated disclosure.
GHSA-g7c4-2w6c-cr3r: Unattributed Pushed-Transaction Failures Permit Batch-Verification Poisoning (Reasonable)
When a immediately pushed mempool transaction failed verification, Zebra didn’t report the sending peer’s handle on the failure, so the peer was by no means misbehavior-scored or banned. As a result of Orchard proof verification runs by way of a process-global batch verifier shared by mempool and block verification, a peer may repeatedly push transactions carrying invalid Orchard proofs for free of charge, forcing every shared batch onto the gradual per-proof path, together with trustworthy proofs from block processing batched alongside, and sustaining a measured block-processing slowdown for so long as the site visitors continued. There was no crash, consensus divergence, or state corruption. Zebra now attributes pushed-transaction verification failures to the sending peer so the prevailing misbehavior scoring can ban it. This closes the verification-failure attribution hole left by the admission-accounting repair in GHSA-m9xx-8rcj-vmgp. Due to @ebfull of Challenge Tachyon and @ValarDragon of Valar Group for reporting this problem by way of coordinated disclosure.
GHSA-4g24-549m-hp75: Quadratic Clear Worth Test in Block Verification (Reasonable)
Throughout contextual verification, Zebra checked the remaining clear worth of each non-coinbase transaction by cloning and changing the whole block-level spent-output map as soon as per transaction, turning a linear verify into quadratic work. A block close to the scale restrict full of minimal single-input transactions (as much as roughly 26,000) may take over 52 seconds to validate on quick {hardware}. As a result of the affected code runs solely after proof-of-work checks move, triggering it requires a validly mined block (produced immediately or by seeding the mempool for an trustworthy miner), which bounds the assault to a one-time, self-clearing stall per block with no crash, consensus divergence, or state corruption. Zebra now passes every transaction solely the outputs it spends, making the verify linear in complete inputs. Due to @ebfull of Challenge Tachyon and @ValarDragon of Valar Group for reporting this problem.
GHSA-8gxx-hc65-vv82: Chain Stall by way of Stale parent_error_map Entry (Reasonable)
When a block failed contextual verification, Zebra recorded its hash in an in-memory map and propagated that failure to any baby block whose guardian was within the map, however entries have been solely eliminated by a set measurement restrict or a restart, by no means when the canonical block at that hash later dedicated efficiently. Utilizing the identical ZIP-244 coinbase-malleability primitive as GHSA-4m69-67m6-prqp, an unauthenticated peer that received the propagation race may get a poisoned block sharing a canonical block’s hash rejected first, so the canonical successor was then rejected towards the stale entry, stalling the node at that peak for roughly 41 hours per set off and repeatable on every new block. The stall cleared on restart, with no crash, consensus divergence, or state corruption. Zebra now removes a hash from the map when the canonical block at that hash commits efficiently. Due to @deedim for reporting this problem, together with a deterministic proof of idea and evaluation of its relationship to GHSA-4m69-67m6-prqp.
Thank You to Our Contributors
This launch was made doable by the work of @aphelionz, @evan-forbes, @jvff, @oxarbitrage, @upbqdn, and @weifanglab. Thanks to your continued contributions to Zebra.
Zebra is the Zcash Basis’s impartial, Rust-based implementation of the Zcash protocol. Be taught extra at github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra.
