The 2013 selfish-mining paper by Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer [0] introduces a variable γ:
We denote by γ the ratio of trustworthy miners that select to mine on the pool’s block, and the opposite (1−γ) of the non-pool miners mine on the opposite department.
The essential thought is that the attacker pool withholds their block till they find out about a competing block from an trustworthy miner. Since trustworthy nodes desire the primary block they see, this variable expresses the power of the attacker to race their block in entrance of the trustworthy block.
Particularly this refers back to the fraction of miner nodes that see the attacking block first. As defined of their simulation part:
We assume block propagation time is negligible in comparison with mining time, as is the case in actuality. Within the case of two branches of the identical size, we artificially divide the non-pool miners such {that a} ratio of γ of them mine on the pool’s department and the remainder mine on the opposite department.
The simulation produces determine 2:
I am confused about essentially the most pessimistic situation γ=0, i.e. any time the attacker pool tries to race in entrance of the trustworthy block they fail miserably. Intuitively I’d count on such a pool to persistently lose cash, so why does not the crimson line keep under the gray line?
Is there some further assumption within the paper that I am lacking?
